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Abstract 
 
The question I intend to answer is whether one can speak of a tacit 
metaphysics, not expressed conceptually, but nevertheless common. If the 
answer is positive and providing that it is specific to day-to-day life, such 
metaphysics may be called everyday metaphysics. To this end, I review the 
meaning of everyday life and its ambivalent character. Next, I present several 
milestones in the debate on the subject, from authors who have focused on a 
kind of usual, common or ‘natural’ metaphysics. Lastly, I formulate the idea 
under consideration, namely that everyday life implies or underlies a certain 
metaphysics. I note that it is an implicit metaphysics – not expressed formally 
– and rather free. Embraced in experience with a certain degree of freedom, it 
is recognisable by means of certain representations active in our mind, by the 
manner of speaking or of understanding and by the common forms of 
expression. Its vibrancy, concrete and relaxed character makes it highly 
evocative of the mental life of an era. It ensures a truly essential difference in 
our everyday mode of being. 
 
Keywords: everyday life, habitual and preliminary behaviours, 
phenomenology of the “as-if”, common understanding, publicness of time, 
presupposition, everyday metaphysics 
 
 
 
I. Preliminary considerations 
 
1. I would like to draw attention to a few relatively simple 
issues, starting from certain recurrent questions in our debates, 
such as: Can one speak of a tacit metaphysics, not expressed 
conceptually, yet customary, usually? Can it be viewed as 
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habitual or everyday metaphysics? Which authors might 
encourage such a perspective on metaphysics and what 
arguments might they invoke to this end? How could such 
usual metaphysics be justified within what we designate as the 
everyday life-world? 
I would not dwell on these questions were it not for the 
frequent occurrence of the term “metaphysics” in debates which 
do not concern any of the doctrines about this concept which 
have evolved over time. One may find the term in discussions 
about the prevailing worldview in a particular period (for 
instance, when referring to “the metaphysics of modern man”). 
Or in reflections about a meaningful attitude towards one’s own 
existence (such as “natural attitude” and the metaphysics it 
entails). At other times, the attention is focused on the 
perspectives opened up by allegorical narratives (for example, 
the underlying metaphysics in José Saramago’s novel All the 
Names). The term is also used to refer to certain convictions 
assumed by a dominant experience, such as the technological 
one. Indeed, it has been asserted that the current technique is a 
culmination of modern metaphysics (Martin Heidegger). They 
both express the same kind of will and the same beliefs or 
presuppositions. Nevertheless, I would note that the term 
“metaphysics” is especially used to designate the power of a 
language to generate concepts, images or representations. We 
know, for that matter, that a much debated claim in recent 
times asserts that any language brings with itself a certain 
metaphysics (Friedrich Nietzsche). It is an idea espoused by 
many analysts of language, and certain writers concerned with 
the link between language and underlying beliefs1. Research on 
natural language and equally on common or everyday language 
has also rediscovered this idea.  
Moreover, others have claimed that modern man, despite 
what he might think about himself, cannot completely escape 
the sphere of the historical logos and its underlying 
metaphysics (Jacques Derrida). This entails that the 
metaphysical attitude can be traced as a sublayer in diverse 
activities and pursuits, from the scholarly to the mundane 
(Richard Rorty). It will not appear necessarily as a well-META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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structured vision, but rather as presuppositions, beliefs and 
representations. 
Yet none of the situations evoked above fall under the 
scholarly or academic meaning of metaphysics. They are not 
related to a conceptually developed theory or to an erudite 
pursuit of metaphysics. Rather, they most often concern a 
particular behaviour of the mind, a mode of understanding the 
state of the self and of the world it is a part of. In other words, 
the focus is on a concrete manner of understanding, as 
experienced by someone among us or by a community as a 
whole. Metaphysics, under this guise, represents a forma 
mentis, therefore it may not appear in the form of elaborate 
theories and concepts.   
 
2. It is not hard to notice that, in essence, the attitude of 
modern man towards metaphysics is profoundly ambivalent. On 
the one hand, one may witness an explicit rejection of 
metaphysics, especially when it is the doctrine of an author or 
of an entire school of thought. On the other hand, however, 
metaphysics may be invoked rather naturally as an obvious 
level of comprehension2. In the latter case, there is a fair degree 
of freedom in the use of the term and in the acknowledgment of 
metaphysical representations or perspectives. 
Ultimately, it is not necessary to think like Aristotle or 
Schopenhauer – or even to think what they thought in their 
own time – to speak of metaphysics. It suffices, say, to use 
certain representations of the self and of the other, the life-
world, temporality and space, appearance and reality. Indeed, 
whose mind is detached from such representations, ideas or 
beliefs? When such representations blend into a vision and 
transgress the empirical knowledge (or “physical”, in the 
ancient sense of the term), they can be called metaphysical. 
This is also true when their role is that of “first instance” or 
“ultimate instance”, as preliminary elements in the pursuit of 
knowledge. In such situations they emerge as boundary data or 
edges of the horizon beyond which the mind cannot go. 
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II. On the ambivalence of everyday life 
 
1. Habitual and preliminary behaviours  
 
I believe I should state what I understand “everyday life” to be. 
I do not have a definition for the phrase, yet I am not 
necessarily looking for one either. The synonymy brought into 
play by certain dictionaries is not particularly useful to this 
end. For example, the understanding of everyday life as 
habitual life, or as regular or publicly exposed life, does not 
sufficiently clarify this issue. Each of these phrases requires an 
explanation and, occasionally, may further obscure the meaning 
of everyday life. 
We could say though, to start with, that everyday life is 
the habitual life, the generic place of habitual behaviours and 
gestures. I use the word “habitual” in the sense expressed by 
the past participle of “to habituate”. One leads a habitual life 
when one is habituated with certain behaviours or acts, on the 
one hand, and with certain regular situations, on the other 
hand. Yet how does a habitual behaviour become an everyday 
behaviour? 
A habitual behaviour, whether it is thinking, expressing 
or doing, is regularly an acquired behaviour, that is one which 
has reached a familiar form, as a habit accepted naturally. It is 
a behaviour learned over time, yet in a fairly contingent and 
free manner. Becoming habituated with something means 
learning a particular behaviour3. Behaviour is in this state a 
reflexive act: you become habituated  with walking daily the 
same road or with the basic use of certain tools. To acquire 
something, to adopt it as natural and wholly expected, to 
become familiar with it, all of these pertain to our everyday life. 
That which is acquired is learned one way or another, 
depending on one’s own manner of relating with the others and 
the surrounding world. It eventually becomes a familiar fact, 
accepted as such by almost everyone, sometimes as an instinct 
of everyday life. 
We are all aware of such behaviours and follow them in 
our own way. Let us consider, almost at random, habits such as 
reading the paper in the morning, using a means of transport, META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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strolling in the park in the evening, drinking coffee, going to 
work every day, making daily notes, using an umbrella or 
walking stick, meeting friends, wearing a wristwatch, talking 
about the weather or the death of acquaintances, casually 
looking outside the window, searching for a quiet place to rest, 
employing certain tools and machinery, talking on the phone 
with loved ones, etc. Everyday life consists of such behaviours 
and gestures. Some are apparently disarmingly simple, yet 
others seem to contradict the common notion of everyday life.  
To be a part of everyday life, habits take the form of 
stable and relatively free dispositions. For example, the habit of 
taking down all sorts of data, names and events in a diary is 
not governed by strictly determined conditions. It is actualised 
only when one receives an explicit exterior motivation, as when 
one deems the action to be absolutely useful. It does not require 
any special preparation. It is dependant rather on elementary 
and concrete experience. The act does not necessarily involve a 
certain regularity to become habitual or any particular 
deliberate repetition. 
Indeed, the free acquisition of certain attitudes or 
gestures indicates the elementary form of human experience. I 
do not believe that there is any other form of experience that 
precedes it essentially and exceeds it in scope. We might say 
that this is in reality a preliminary experience, whether it aids 
or thwarts other experiences. Its scope is ultimately that of life 
proper, even when man ends up battling it and opposing it by 
what he does or thinks. Yet compared with other experiences, it 
occurs most often by itself. It is usually relaxed and tranquil 
without any severe exigencies. One cannot properly speak of a 
technique of modern life or a finely tuned mechanics of its 
articulations. When harsh exigency or elaborate technique come 
into play, everyday life breaks down and makes way for a 
different experience. 
What could we observe in fact in such situations of 
ordinary life? Ultimately, there is a kind of alchemy of habit. It 
is capable of transforming a specific fact into a common one, an 
uncanny phenomenon into a familiar one, difference into the 
unremarkable and the beauty of the moment into something 
prosaic. That is to say, there exists a genuine athanor of Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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everyday life. In this athanor, the data of life can change their 
meaning decisively. Yet – and this is paramount to my 
comments further on – the change in a behaviour does not 
mean it is restricted to a univocal sense. When a specific fact 
becomes common, it does not completely lose its specific 
character. Similarly, when the uncanny event becomes familiar 
to us, it does not entail the complete loss of its uncanniness4. It 
will never disappear completely; rather it will undergo a 
process of concealment or withdrawal.  
Each term that casually describes everyday life – as we 
have seen, the common character, familiarity, indifference or 
prosaic character – does not mean anything by itself. In their 
singularity, they signal only one facet of this phenomenon. As 
soon as we hear such terms, we must think of the term which 
has been excluded or left on the side. Their correlation is 
important, as their meaning is brought to light in conjunction, 
through contrasts or divergences. 
My point is that everyday life is not by definition 
univocal: strictly common or strictly ordinary. On the contrary, 
it invites the elementary co-presence of contrary terms: 
common and specific, familiar and uncanny, ordinary and 
extraordinary, etc. It is not characterised by a single attitude, 
“natural” or “naïve”, as it would have been called once. Rather, 
in its scope, such an attitude meets the “critical” attitude, and 
they affect each other constantly. Everyday life is the space of 
their encounter, of their natural and preliminary “collusion”. It 
does not separate the “opposites”, but makes possible their 
emergence and maintains it in a fundamental, elementary 
correlation. The differences manifested, for instance between 
the banal and the significant, do not become separations. When 
they do take the form of separations, accentuating the 
oppositions they conceal, consciousness passes from its 
everyday mode to a different one. Consciousness is then able to 
deal with a distinct, highly elaborate condition, such as the 
theoretical and the speculative condition. Ultimately, each 
human experience can elaborate a different form from the 
everyday one, more severe or more formal. Yet it never 
withdraws from the sphere of everyday life. This sphere, META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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elementary or preliminary, retains it to a certain extent and 
determines its relation with the others.  
I shall return to this issue later in the text, when I 
consider the uncommon side of the common. 
 
2. Prejudices about what is specific to everyday life 
 
We regularly hear claims that an everyday behaviour is simply 
common. When referring to something as common, the focus is 
most often on a univocal meaning of the term: either something 
ordinary (gross, coarse), or impersonal (average, mediocre, 
stereotype), or banal (prosaic, insignificant, scarce). Other 
synonyms – for example, public, vulgar, collective – capture the 
semantics of the term “common” only univocally and partially. 
Naturally, certain behaviours can be acquired by several 
people, especially as the phenomena of daily contagion and 
imitation remain decisive in the life of any community. Yet it is 
not this fact that defines everyday life. On the other hand, a 
common gesture is rather bland (wearing a wristwatch, taking 
the same route to work, etc.). It does not dislocate the habitual 
flow of gestures and does not induce a change to the previous 
way of life. Routine, for example, expresses properly the 
common fact of being, just as the vulgar standardisation forms 
do (in fashion, manufacturing, transport, performing arts, etc.). 
This may undeniably lead to an average or mediocre attitude. 
Yet everyday behaviour is not in itself mediocre, it does not 
entail stereotype or vulgarity in day-to-day life. Certain events 
specific to it are often novel and have unpredictable effects. 
Is everyday life the same for everyman, i.e. to “no one”? 
Definitely not, it concerns each of us individually, even in 
solitude. An everyday mode of life will manifest the painter as 
he paints alone in his atelier, the physicist as he spends the day 
in the laboratory, the judge as he sentences someone to life in 
prison, the priest as he listens to the confession of a burdened 
man, the player as he waits on the sidelines for a stroke of luck. 
Everyday life is not the space of the lack of originality or 
unpredictability, where everything may occur monotonously 
and impersonally. It is true, on the other hand, that anyone 
may invite “everyman” or “no one” in his behaviour. This may Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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happen at any given show, but also as indifference or apathy or 
curiosity for common things. Such curiosity conceals man’s need 
to vary, in order to compensate, the monotonous or wave-like 
surface of common life. 
Is everyday life, by definition, an anonymous life? 
Certainly not, as it does not completely lose the markings of 
individual or even personal behaviours. Let us admit that an 
acquired behaviour generally becomes a habitual behaviour. In 
this case, it is performed in keeping with habit (either 
someone’s habit or the general habit). It follows a pattern, a 
common mode of expression, which means that it can easily 
become anonymous. Yet this latter thing can occur only under 
certain circumstances. That which is “habitual” is not 
unavoidably impersonal. The same applies to “bad habits”, 
“idiosyncrasies” or “proclivities”. The recurrence typical of any 
habit does not always result in something that is subject to flat 
generality. The habits of reading or taking a walk or looking out 
the window do not necessarily induce an impersonal behaviour. 
Nonetheless, one might detect something impersonal here too: 
someone takes a walk as a walk is regularly taken or looks in 
the distance as this act is commonly performed. There is here a 
tendency towards impersonalisation, more or less visible, yet an 
equally powerful personalisation tendency, however weak it 
may appear to us at any given moment. Never is that limit 
reached where the impersonal character is exclusive and 
irreversible in human behaviour. 
I leave aside the fact that anonymity is not at all a 
negative or fallen condition by itself. Those who embrace this 
meaning, modern and highly ideologized, neglect certain 
elevated forms of anonymity, such as that specific to monastic 
life, or the soldier fallen or left behind on the battle field, no 
less than that of the man retired in a laboratory, forgotten by 
the world, seeking to elucidate some phenomenon on his own. 
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann discuss an everyday 
meaning of anonymity (Berger and Luckmann 1966, I, 2). They 
focus on the manner in which the patterns of social interaction, 
by negotiating patterns, tend to grow ever more distant from 
the here and now of face-to-face setting and become anonymous. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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In other words, the encounter with the other loses its 
expressiveness, uniqueness and atypical character. 
When Heidegger refers to das Man (the impersonal 
“they”), he does not exclude its modulation. He writes at one 
point that “Everydayness is determinative for Dasein even 
when it has not chosen the ‘they’ as its ‘hero’” (Heidegger 1986, 
371; Heidegger 1962, 422). The subject of everyday life emerges 
in a distinct manner, which does not completely exclude the 
personal effect. One’s self can withdraw within all others 
(“everyone is the other and no one is himself”) (Heidegger 1986, 
128; Heidegger 1962, 165)5. In fact, this other is plural (“the 
others”). Yet as an impersonal instance, it cannot be 
determined only in this form, not even for summation purposes: 
“The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst] 
and not some people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The 
‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [das Man]” (Heidegger 1986, 126; 
Heidegger 1962, 164). It is nevertheless a self, i.e. a they-self, an 
instance which, although impersonal and non-specific, involves 
a more complicated design. The force of this self and its 
compelling dominion, as Heidegger himself states, may vary 
considerably over time (Heidegger 1986, 129; Heidegger 1962, 
167). 
Therefore, it is absolutely not appropriate to state that 
everyday life is impersonal by definition. The one who speaks 
as they speak is still different from anyone else. If we were to 
view the “they speak” as an existential structure, it would still 
not be enough to describe everyday life. The one who speaks as 
they speak is inevitably different from all the others. His 
conformity only becomes possible within the framework of this 
difference. The one who speaks in indistinct or indifferent 
manner, does so in a way that can never be repeated as such. 
Consequently, the impersonal functor (for example, the “they 
speak”) cannot describe alone everyday life as a phenomenon. 
Nor can what we call “no one” or “some other”. This is not 
because such hypostases are not specific to everyday life, but 
because they participate in a much more complicated 
phenomenon. The voice they announce rather loudly is not the 
only one that expresses everyday life as such.  Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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I would further add that everyday life must not be 
considered in itself as being fallen. This is often reiterated, 
especially as the motive of estrangement tends to seduce many 
minds in the modern world. When is it usually viewed as such 
though? Probably when it is considered exclusively in terms of 
its platitude and vulgarity, scarcity, insignificance and 
tediousness. Everyday life is described then in its minor forms, 
relying on old clichés. Beyond all these, what is at stake is the 
attitude by means of which we open up to the world. The world 
cannot be considered negative in itself. Discussing it in terms of 
a polarised assessment – positive or negative, authentic or 
inauthentic – means missing its mode of being from the very 
beginning.  
Is everyday life, in itself, insignificant, deprived of any 
elevated or symbolic gesture? Certainly not. What ends up as 
habit, already accustomed, does thereby lose all its significance. 
Becoming accustomed to certain gestures does not equate with 
missing their meaning in all respects. One may actually also 
become familiar with what makes a thing unexpected, such as 
the image of exotic places, the fact of travelling by oneself, 
going on a risky hunting trip, fighting in wars abroad, flouting 
the law, etc. The facts that one has become accustomed to may 
denote a kind of routine, but also something embraced through 
effort and great risk. They may express both a certain 
mechanics of daily life and a long-lived experience. In the 
former case, the formal side of actions matters. Moreover, it can 
become a mere training or social mechanics, as consciousness 
submits to external rulings. In the latter case, each man is 
tested individually. Habit becomes the name of the trial that 
man must face. Or the name of a demanding exercise, 
ultimately a kind of everyday asceticism. 
Therefore, there are always two voices of everyday life, 
yet we cannot state that one expresses the deep level and the 
other the surface level. If we were to employ classical 
terminology, we would say they involve a dual nature. Its 
ambivalent character often goes quite far, as one and the same 
fact may be described in apparently mutually excluding terms. 
Thus, that which is common (for example, going to work every 
day, even taking the same route and means of transportation) META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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appears as specific from another perspective. The common fact 
ends up being felt as a specific fact, as in the case of the 
character in Leo Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich. The 
common and the specific element jointly provide the substance 
of the same everyday act. This also applies to everyday 
indifference. What appears as indifference (for example, 
„ignoring” the presence of others) can be the sign of a form of 
loneliness. Here, eccentric, solitary indifference and difference 
seem to merge into a single gesture. The menace of maximum 
scarcity and the indication of maximum difference occur in the 
very same act. 
 
3. Ordinary and out of the ordinary in everyday life  
 
When referring to ordinary behaviours we usually think about 
regular or routine ones. Yet, this in itself is hard to fathom, 
indeed incomprehensible. In the “ordinary” course of a day, all 
kinds of events take place. Some of them are genuinely 
common, at least at first sight, such as when we travel to work, 
buy regular products, greet acquaintances, listen to the news, 
browse the newspaper headlines, rest after a few exhausting 
hours, etc. However, this is not all that happens when we 
perform these actions. Ordinary actions are not necessarily 
customary, routine (leaving aside the fact that the term 
“routine” carries an uncommon meaning in certain situations: 
“experience”, “trial”, “temptation”)6. All these actions are 
accompanied by many others, occurring either in our senses 
and our minds, or in our encounters with other people, not to 
mention anything that may happen accidentally. 
Yet supposing we do not reject outright the idea of 
certain ordinary behaviours and indeed we should not, how can 
we grasp the presence of something out of the ordinary in 
everyday life? What could we say about our everyday 
behaviours? That they are ordinary in one respect and out of 
the ordinary in others? Or perhaps ordinary at a particular 
moment, but also out of the ordinary at other times? We 
probably face this situation sometimes, even though we might 
not fully appreciate what is extraordinary. There is another 
option, when the ordinary – gestures, words, events – conceal in Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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their very ordinary nature something different altogether. This 
latter situation is relevant for the underlying ambivalence of 
everyday life. 
In his dialogues with Claude-Henri Rocquet, Eliade 
(1978, XI, § 1-2) enumerates such situations where ordinary life 
conceals something out of the ordinary. For example, the 
occurrence of an event which, although it might not announce 
anything initially, suspends unexpectedly the ordinary 
succession of time and makes way for a different temporal flow. 
The simple deviation from a known route, encountering a 
stranger, the vivid and persistent memory of a dream, such 
occurrences can affect the rhythm and quality of experienced 
time. In other situations, however, the obsessive yearning for 
change may interfere or perhaps the desire to surpass the 
human limits, which are experienced profoundly every day. 
This involves the motif of the double (for example, “the attempt 
to love two women at the same time, with equal sincerity”), the 
desire to transgress certain social rules (such as the one 
imposing monogamy) or the need to change the mental state (as 
in the case of the use of narcotics). This also refers to the daily 
yearning to gain access to a different reality, such as the virtual 
one – by reading science fiction stories, watching films or art 
performances or the free interplay of images. In such situations, 
everyday life unfolds on two separate levels. It involves a 
double mode (the waking and oneiric states, according to 
Eliade), so that the empirically verified reality makes easily 
way for utopias and phantasms as well as for myths and certain 
forms viewed as ideal. 
Consequently, we ought to speak of a double or equivocal 
structure of everyday life. How could we then properly 
understand this?  
In temporal terms, it consists of distinct flows, which 
sometimes appear distinct from each other. They differ not only 
in terms of rhythm, but may also be found at different levels, 
such as the pragmatic and oneiric, as we have noted above. 
Each of them possesses a distinct and irreducible quality. 
Nevertheless, they tend to intersect unpredictably, which may 
lead to some odd, shocking or at times violent events. This may 
concern a double underlying tendency of mental life. To borrow META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Eliade’s own terms, it appears as both diurnal and nocturnal. 
In the nocturnal mode of mind, it may be under the influence of 
ancient images or archetypes (an issue explored 
comprehensively by Carl-Gustav Jung). Everyday life is also 
known to be prone to unpredictable, hardly detectable 
transformations, in the form of happenings. An act becomes 
possible by always allowing for freer, looser relationships. 
  
4. A simple example: Vincent’s Chair with His Pipe  
  
The researcher invoked above invites us to recall the Van 
Gogh’s famous canvas Vincent’s Chair with His Pipe (1888-
1889). The chair painted there is plain and empty. The pipe 
itself, rather randomly positioned on the chair, accentuates the 
fact that the chair is empty. An ordinary chair in a nondescript 
place, nothing more. Its reality and that of the space it occupies 
are rather ordinary, almost banal. The few elements that 
constitute such a reality belong, to a certain extent, to the 
painter’s simple and ordinary world: a door on one side, odd 
items in a chest, a pipe left on a chair and a plain wall.  
Yet even in this ordinary space, there is something that 
gives pause. It is that empty, solitary chair itself. Should you 
dwell too much on it, your mind will be taken elsewhere, to 
something absent or concealed. This absence is ultimately the 
single genuinely significant aspect in this painting. It is a 
dense, persistent absence that grabs hold of your gaze and 
focuses it where you cannot actually see anything. However, 
you can sense something there, either the shadow of someone 
who left somewhere, either another, foreign gaze, of the painter 
himself, looking forlorn and wistful at the place of his absence. 
Yet it is not only this dense and persistent absence that 
troubles the gaze, but also the overwhelming loneliness of that 
space. It does not derive from the fact that Vincent’s chair sits 
alone there, just as the other few surrounding items, i.e. a pipe, 
a wall. A single thing, even when you expect to find many more, 
does not generate by this fact alone the sense of loneliness. 
Such a feeling originates elsewhere, namely the odd perspective 
on the items, which apparently lack any obvious relationship, 
as though any of them could be absent or be present in another Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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place. It is a sort of total, absolute contingency, which causes 
things to be so foreign one to the other that you are 
immediately stricken by the loneliness of the one who saw them 
through this perspective. Someone who is truly alone cannot 
find his own place. More precisely, there is no place for him in 
the world which he can nevertheless see in a certain manner. 
The lack of a place makes everything appear as an accident or 
void, his loneliness viewing things only in these terms. The 
empty chair in the painting expresses therefore the total 
loneliness of the gaze. All of these things can be said of a space 
that, at first glance, might seem completely ordinary. 
Consequently, Eliade is right to repeat an idea that he is 
obsessed about: “It is certain that this bleak reality /in Van 
Gogh’s painting/, this daily life camouflages something else. 
This is my profound conviction” (Eliade 1978, XI, § 2). To him, 
such a view entails multiple consequences. One such 
consequence concerns the need to grasp the double or 
complicated structure of everyday life. Another one refers to the 
way in which we represent our own life and seek to express 
ourselves, whether it is a simple account, or certain literary or 
research works. All novels can create a feeling of a certain 
camouflage of the uncanny in the life of the ordinary. This is 
not dependent on a certain type of writing – such as fantasy 
stories – or on a particular style. It does not depend on a 
particular form of creativity, such as literature. Rather it 
concerns any of our life spaces and any form of creation, from 
those viewed as minor to the truly elevated ones. 
One of Eliade’s confessions is remarkable in this respect: 
“In all my stories, the narrative unfolds across several planes, 
in order to reveal progressively the “fantasy” hidden in 
everyday banality. Just as a new axiom reveals a certain design 
of reality, unknown until then – in other words, establishes a 
new world – fantasy literature discloses – or rather creates – 
parallel universes. This is not about escapism, as philosophers 
of history would claim, but creativeness – on all levels and in all 
meanings of the term – as the hallmark of human condition.” 
Indeed our image about the everyday life could change 
considerably if we paid closer attention to its emergence and to 
what is particular to man.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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5. On the meaning of usual things 
 
I would like to make a further comment on Eliade’s assertions 
(Eliade 1978, XI, § 2). When he speaks about everyday life, he 
refers to certain usual acts, as he terms them. The term “usual” 
calls to mind either something that is common and recurrent, 
repetitive, or something that over time has become outworn. In 
fact both meanings may be at play: what becomes common and 
occurs almost mechanically day in and day out ends up wearing 
down its meanings. It loses much of its significance, as it is 
performed out of inertia or the mere force of things (as is the 
case for securing drinking water or equally habitual tending 
some flowers on the window sill). In time such activities tend to 
become like old worn coins which, although they may serve for 
regular economic transactions, tend to have flattened 
engravings. Moreover, at a certain point they lose even their 
economic worth, as wear and tear excludes them from practical 
economic exchanges. A sort of semiotic erosion comes into play, 
as the relation with those who do use them tends to become 
indifferent.  
Nevertheless, usual acts, just as worn coins, will 
preserve in discrete forms a certain symbolical significance. If 
we examine them carefully we will realise that they are not 
performed at random. They cannot be done in a purely 
haphazard manner, disregarding one’s disposition or state. This 
means that, beyond their usual character, they retain certain 
symbolical rules pertaining to the rituals of day to day life.  
Unfortunately, we often tend to use the term “ordinary” 
as a mere synonym for “banal” or even “insignificant”7. However 
it expresses something performed according to a custom or code 
of life in the community. For example, what is habitual in the 
home of a family or in their community, in their private life 
cannot be violated at any cost. Behind such facts there are 
always certain beliefs, representations and symbols whose 
power is difficult to ignore. I would like to stress that the 
phrase “ordinary behaviour” ultimately refers to norms 
instituted for a long time. It reflects the existence of a diffuse 
code of everyday life. This code is its concealed side, which often 
fades into an unrecognisable state. Its presence – and that of Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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minor, yet not insignificant rituals – is nowadays more 
thoroughly camouflaged. In other words, ordinary things hide 
diffuse codes of human coexistence. Behind the ordinary – 
whether we realise it or not – there lie certain basic and 
elementary rules, beliefs and symbolical representations. It is 
difficult, therefore, to state that they are simply banal and 
contingent, lacking any significance. 
Well, let us accept for now that there are no ordinary 
acts or gestures deprived of significance. Could we infer that 
everything is significant in our everyday life and that nothing is 
without meaning? 
Not at all, as there is much without meaning in what we 
do and say, in our gestures and decisions. Yet lack of meaning 
is not necessarily a feature of everyday life. The absence of 
meaning does not have a privileged place in the life that we call 
ordinary and view as everyday. Are there not enough 
statements without meaning in supposedly academic discourse 
or in philosophical texts? Aren’t there many questions without 
meaning posed in discussions with a scientific or philosophical 
intent? Our conceptual language sometimes exceeds in 
meaningless terms and semantically empty sentences. We are 
constantly faced with countless purely formal terms and bizarre 
hypotheses as though scholarly literature attempted to compete 
with the Dada literary experimentations. Not to mention the 
myriad absurd projects or decisions, which signal not only the 
mere absence of meaning, but also its violent or barbaric 
rejection. Such projects and decisions make up the contents of 
many events in our life, especially non-daily ones. What 
happened in the years during the Second World War and in 
subsequent years, in concentration camps and gulags, in 
prisons, in defaced or destroyed living spaces, in exile and 
solitude, all surpass the boundaries of everyday life. 
Unfortunately, such ordeals became a matter of everyday life, 
yet their sources were not in the least common. Absurd gesture 
ended up providing the contents of a historical era, without 
being considered ordinary. What barbaric or cruel rules could 
underlie such appalling gestures? What kind of strange code 
could regulate from within what happened through the 
decades? META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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As we can clearly see, things are much more complicated 
than they appear at first sight. Yet reviewing such a dark 
landscape, where the non-sense and the absurd regulate the 
ordinary, can provide a further argument for the assertion that 
everyday life is never something simple and ordinary. 
 
6. A phenomenology under an as-if regime 
 
One may wonder, in this case, what kind of ontology is specific 
to the everyday fact, which exhibits this dual, alternative voice. 
Is it an ontology similar to the Platonic one? Does it allow for 
inequalities that can lead to profoundly dual relationships, such 
as those between substance and appearance? Specifically, does 
everyday ontology conceal a certain dualism? Or, on the 
contrary, does it cancel such inequalities at once with the 
Platonic meaning of the terms at stake? Could this latter case 
be one of plain and evanescent phenomenalization of tendencies 
or meanings? 
It is difficult to choose between the two already known 
perspectives. Rather, I would believe the answer lies elsewhere. 
In everyday attitude, as we know, the mind of man does not 
reject the idea that existing things have substance or 
conversely that everything may be a game of appearance. It 
does not mean that the human mind contradicts itself all the 
time. When something is accepted as substance, it is not 
however something “general” or “ultimate”. The same applies 
for the appearance of existing things. On the other hand, what 
is at stake is not wholly subjective and arbitrary, for in this 
case the reference points of life would be lost. However they are 
never lost, even though their power might greatly decline under 
certain circumstances. 
It is noteworthy that in everyday life itself man 
experiences something indeterminate in the face of the 
subjective will, something that overcomes it and reveals man’s 
own limitations. Paul Ricoeur referred at one point to the 
presence of already-there of life and of our understanding 
(Ricoeur 1967, 205-218). Their meaning is not one of pre-
established conditions, but rather phenomenological: they are 
existentially constitutive and manifest only at once with that Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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which they themselves make possible. Above all, this is about 
the fact of situatedness in the world, which erects impassable 
limits to consciousness and reflects its elementary facticity. In 
addition to this fact there is the fact of the presence of the living 
body, the condition of temporality or life in history, the constant 
presence of the other, the language we speak and free will. 
Indeed, these are some absolutely fundamental terms: the 
world, the body, time, the other, language and free action. 
Obviously, this is not the only way we can think of or perceive 
what exceeds man’s subjective will.  
I wish to return to my claim above, namely that in 
everyday life that which is regarded as substantial and 
apparent is not taken to be definitive. I will set aside for now 
those attitudes – be they aesthetic, technical or religious – that 
may profoundly modify the ontology of everyday life. 
Nevertheless nothing appears as pure essence or as pure 
fiction. If facts make their substance visible, the latter does not 
completely escape the condition of temporality. This means that 
it is seen as if it were so. The same is true of the appearance of 
existing things. Both terms of perceptions are under the 
influence of as if. This is not about extreme fiction or the 
perception of all things in a purely spectacular mode. That is 
why I would like to refer now to a certain type of 
phenomenology, situated beyond the radicalism secured by the 
sheer power of Husserlian reduction. It is a phenomenology 
typical of the as if attitude, therefore freer or more lax8. It 
easily allows for dissimulation and game, the recurrent 
ambivalence of certain behaviours and the equivocal of certain 
forms of expression. 
I would stress again though that the space of everyday 
life does not become, as a result, an endless spectacle. Can not 
understand any in terms of game, simulation and spectacle, no 
matter how hard certain specialists, sociologists in particular, 
may try to impose the latter idea.  
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III. References for an awareness of everyday 
metaphysics 
 
1. “The common understanding of time” (Heidegger) 
 
I will first return to a few pages from The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology  (Heidegger 1997, II, § 19, b), where Martin 
Heidegger discusses “the common understanding of time 
(vulgäres Zeitverständnis)”. I believe that such understanding 
of time, beyond its problematic aspects, illustrates the workings 
of metaphysics in our daily life. Simply put, the common or 
vulgar understanding of time can indicate the presence of a 
common or vulgar metaphysics. I would prefer to call it 
everyday metaphysics, or metaphysics for everyday use. 
We know that Heidegger often deals with the multiple 
manner of signification of the being. He discusses both the pre-
ontological signification and the ontological, or ultimately, 
metaphysical signification. He states at a certain point that “we 
live in an understanding of Being” even though the meaning of 
Being is sometimes veiled in darkness (Heidegger 1986, § 1). In 
other words, the Dasein “is ontological”, not in the sense that it 
inquires theoretically about the Being of entities, but “being in 
such a way that one has an understanding of Being” (§ 4). As 
regards man, there is a “predilection for metaphysics” (as he 
notes in a phenomenological study on the Critique of Pure 
Reason). The idea brings to mind the notion of natural 
disposition (Naturanlage) for metaphysics once asserted by 
Kant  (1968, 41). Yet such remarks do not focus on the 
metaphysics viewed in the Aristotelian tradition, as 
examination of the being in general. They also do not deal with 
metaphysics viewed as a mode of understanding the being in 
opposition with time (hence, either as “Platonism”, as Nietzsche 
preferred to say, or as “ontologism”, a thematisation in 
relationship with “what truly exists”). And they focus even less 
so on metaphysics understood as an era of forgetting the Being 
(Haeffner 1981). In light of these three great meanings of 
metaphysics, to be found especially in certain reference 
doctrines, Heidegger refers to a type of metaphysics where 
“every time we live already”. We live, that is, to the extent that Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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that we live in “an understanding of the Being”. In other words, 
this is about experienced metaphysics, assumed through the 
senses and already presupposed by what we do or think in our 
everyday lives.  
 
Time as a sequence of nows. At the outset, Heidegger 
remarks that, in the Aristotelian tradition, time is viewed 
primarily as “sequence of nows where it should be noted that 
‘the nows’ are not parts from which time is pieced together into 
a whole” (Heidegger 1997, 362; Heidegger 1982, 256). This is 
actually the “common, pre-scientific understanding of time”. He 
refers to the common understanding of time (vulgäres 
Zeitverständnis), common time (vulgäre Zeit) and common 
conception of time (vulgärer Begriff der Zeit), each of these 
relating to the meaning of original time (ursprüngliche Zeit). If 
the phrase vulgäres Zeitverständnis were translated as “vulgar 
understanding of time”, the term “vulgar” should be taken in its 
neutral sense, considering its Latin etymon (vulgaris, meaning 
“common” or “ordinary”, “public”, “valid for many”).  
How exactly does this representation of time become 
obvious? This meaning is at stake every time we measure time. 
For example, when we use a clock, “we measure time whenever 
we need it” (as when “we take time or let it pass”). We use easy 
to a fore-understanding of time (“When we look at a clock, since 
time itself does not lie in the clock, we assign time to the clock. 
In looking at the clock we say ‘now’”) (Heidegger 1997, 368; 
Heidegger 1982, 260-261). What does this fore-understanding of 
time consist in? 
First of all, the time determined reading a clock is a 
usual time, which serves a purpose. As Heidegger states, “the 
time I am trying to determine is always ‘time to’, time in order 
to do this or that, time that I need for, time that I can permit 
myself in order to accomplish this or that, time that I must take 
for carrying through this or that” (Heidegger 1997, 364; 
Heidegger 1982, 258). We are thus already taking time into 
account and reckoning with it whenever we measure it. 
Therefore, we orient ourselves in advance based on a 
“now”, without reflecting on it (“In looking at the clock we say 
‘now’”). This “now” we are directed to is not a naked pure, now, META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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but “that wherefore and whereto there is still time now” 
(Heidegger 1997, 365; Heidegger 1982, 259). It expresses my 
distinct relationship towards things or towards other people. 
Thus "whenever I say "now" I am comporting myself toward 
something extant or, more precisely, toward something present 
which is in my present” (Heidegger 1997, 367; Heidegger 1982, 
260). Heidegger calls this comportment Gegenwärtigen, 
“enprésenting of something”. 
The enprésenting attitude is correlated with two other 
comportments, expecting something (expressed by “forthwith”) 
and retaining something (spoken of in the “earlier”). Their unity 
is not elucidated in the common understanding of time. To be 
elucidated they ought to be placed in a relationship with an 
“original time”, by way of which the different moments of time 
could be understood, even in their possibility. Yet such unity is 
at this point greatly obscured. 
As we have already noted, ordinary consciousness 
understands time “as a sequence of nows from the not-yet-now 
to the no-longer-now”. This sequence has meaning, an “intrinsic 
direction from the future to the past”. That is precisely why we 
usually “say that time passes, elapses” (Heidegger 1997, 368-
369; Heidegger 1982, 260). This sequence is “directed 
uniformly”, in accordance with an irreversible movement. 
Moreover, about the sequence of now we tend to designate it “as 
infinite”. Therefore, the common understanding of time is that 
of the sequence of nows, in a single irreversible and infinite 
direction. 
 
Belief in the existence within a natural time. This 
common time is viewed as “already given to us”  (Heidegger 
1997, 365; Heidegger 1982, 259). Being “already given to us”, 
we can take time, let it pass, measure it and use it in various 
other ways. The “given” of time does not raise any doubts or 
questions (such as for instance, by whom exactly is it given? 
And to whom? Is it given naturally or in some other way?). We 
take time for granted, as we are already accustomed to this 
relationship with time and do not question how it was actually 
constituted. Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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In the common understanding, time appears as 
appropriate and inappropriate time for something specific. “All 
time we read from the clock is time to …, ‘time to do this or 
that’, appropriate or inappropriate time [...]. We designated by 
the term “significance” this totality of relations of the ‘in-order-
to’, ‘for-the-sake-of’, ‘for-that-purpose’, ‘to-that-end’” (Heidegger 
1997, 369-370; Heidegger 1982, 261-262). In light of this 
character of significance, time understood as appropriate and 
inappropriate time is a “world-time [Weltzeit]” (Heidegger 1997, 
370; Heidegger 1982, 262). Yet the common understanding of 
time is “little aware of […] significance” (Heidegger 1997, 372; 
Heidegger 1982, 263) and cannot thematise it. 
We ordinarily believe that we live in a natural time, yet 
this does not exist. This statement, shocking at first, reflects 
the specific results of existential analysis. “[…] This does not 
mean that the time we read from the clock is something extant 
like intrawordly things. We know, of course, that the world is 
not an extant entity [Vorhandenes], not nature, but that which 
first makes possible the uncoveredness of nature. It is therefore 
also inappropriate, as frequently happens, to call this time 
nature-time or natural time. There is no nature-time, since all 
time belongs essentially to the Dasein. But there is indeed a 
world-time [Weltzeit]” (Heidegger 1997, 370; Heidegger 1982, 
262). 
Dating seems to rely on calendar dating, yet in fact 
things are more complicated. Heidegger refers initially to 
datability (“this relational structure of the ‘now’ as ‘now-when’, 
of the ‘at-the-time’ as ‘at-the-time-when’, and of the ‘then’ as 
‘then-when’”) (Heidegger 1997, 371; Heidegger 1982, 262). 
Indeed it makes possible the dating of time, and the date we 
express may be indefinite, uncertain or different from the 
calendar date. “Nevertheless, the common conception of time as 
a sequence of nows is just as little aware of the moment of pre-
calendrical datability as of that of significance” (Heidegger 
1997, 371; Heidegger 1982, 263). 
Temporal moments usually appear to us as though they 
were free-floating “relationless, intrinsically patched on to one 
another and intrinsically successive” (Heidegger 1997, 371; 
Heidegger 1982, 263). Likewise they appear as definite points. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
  350 
 
 
To deconstruct this meaning, Heidegger discusses their 
character of “meanwhile” (Inzwischen) or spannedness. Each 
time moment is a meanwhile (a “during” or a “from now till 
then”) (Heidegger 1997, 372; Heidegger 1982, 263). 
 
The publicness of common time. In the common 
relationship with time, the ‘publicness’ (Öffentlichkeit) of time 
is also involved (Heidegger 1997, 369-374; Heidegger 1982, 261-
264). It expresses “the now” within an essential relationship 
with the other, which Heidegger terms Miteinandersein (being-
with-one-another). “When any one of us says ‘now’, we all 
understand this now, even though each of us perhaps dates this 
now by starting from a different thing or event: ‘now, when the 
professor is speaking’, ‘now when the students are writing’ or 
‘now, in the morning’, ‘now, towards the end of the semester” 
(Heidegger 1997, 373; Heidegger 1982, 264). 
This public character of time entails something 
paradoxical. “Although each one of us utters his own ‘now’, it is 
nevertheless the ‘now’ for everyone. The accessibility of the 
‘now’ for everyone, without prejudice to the diverse datings, 
characterizes time as public” (Heidegger 1997, 373; Heidegger 
1982, 264). What can we infer from this? The existential 
structure called Miteinandersein does not cancel the solitude of 
each individual man. Ultimately, every single person is alone 
and yet with the others. Everyon e  i s  a l o n e  a s  t h e y  g i v e  a  
distinct understanding of their temporal “now”, dating it 
according to their own needs and the demands of their various 
preoccupations. However, everyone is able to understand the 
“now” uttered by others, to the best of their abilities. The 
other’s “now” is accessible to each; this is how “the ‘now’ is for 
all” must be understood. 
Likewise, the fact of being-with-one-other makes us 
equal rather in terms of what we do not have or do not possess. 
The publicness of time declares that ultimately, to a certain 
extent, time does not belong to anyone. Like death, as a matter 
of fact. Yet this deprivation is compensated in a certain 
manner. “On account of this character of time a peculiar 
objectivity is assigned to it. The ‘now’ belongs neither to me, nor 
to anyone else, but it is somehow there. There is time, time is Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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given, it is extant, without our being able to say how and 
where” (Heidegger 1997, 373; Heidegger 1982, 264). 
All that is common – the common conception of 
something or its public character – does not therefore belong to 
anyone. In other words, we should not claim that a “common 
representation” or a “common meaning” exists in someone’s 
mind. Such common meaning is not constituted as such in one’s 
mind, but exists providing that each one, in their solitude, is 
being-with-one-another. 
 
The sense of losing time. Common time seems to be given to 
us only in a univocal expression (such as “there is time” or 
“there is no time”, “we have time” or “we don’t have time”). Yet, 
as Heidegger notes, each characteristic of time reflects both 
what we feel in a particular way and its opposite. Hence he 
speaks of a specific fact in the common understanding of time, 
namely losing time. “We also lose time, just as immediately as 
we constantly take time for ourselves. We leave time for 
ourselves with something, and in fact in such a way that while 
we do so the time is not there. A s  w e  l o s e  t i m e ,  w e  g i v e  i t  
away.” Perhaps in the vulgar understanding of time, we turn it 
into a thing, an object, which, consequently, might be had or 
lost. We ignore the fact that certain intentional attitudes play a 
role (“as we lose time, we give it away”). Likewise, we disregard 
the fact that time is not there, is not given and at-hand. 
At this point, Heidegger discerns another aspect – in 
absolutely admirable fashion. It is the fact that prior to losing 
time we take time or reckon with time for our preoccupations. 
Consequently, losing time emerges as a way in which we leave 
time for ourselves: “But losing time is a particularly carefree 
leaving time for oneself, one way in which we have time in the 
oblivious passing of our lives” (Heidegger 1997, 374; Heidegger 
1982, 264). Thus losing time is explained by a kind of 
indifference in how we make use of time, an indifference which 
is, in its turn, an everyday form of oblivion. 
Yet, what kind of oblivion is there in the everyday mode 
of life? Oblivion to what? If we take into account that everyday 
time must be placed in relationship with an “original time” and 
how it shapes the overall understanding of the being META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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(Heidegger 1997, 367; Heidegger 1982, 260), then oblivion 
relates precisely to this “original time”. It also concerns the 
distinct understanding that this relationship makes possible. 
Indeed the first to lose its condition of possibility is one’s 
realisation of the meaning of being.  
 
Common time and original time. The relationship between 
the vulgar representation of time and its elaborate 
philosophical representation is rather convoluted. In a rather 
peculiar manner, Aristotle is said to have represented time in a 
similar way to the common one (Heidegger 1997, 367; 
Heidegger 1982, 260) as did other prominent philosophers, from 
Augustine to Kant and later Bergson. They did not go, 
supposedly, beyond the vulgar understanding of time and did 
not deconstruct it completely. This was due to their primary 
focus on what happens with things “in time” and “naturally”. 
This means that, to a certain extent, philosophical 
consciousness can easily encounter common consciousness. 
Sometimes philosophical consciousness relies on the data 
provided by the common consciousness. Phenomenologically 
though, one can observe that the common conception conceals 
the true structure of time. To unveil it, Heidegger distinguishes 
between several attitudes or intentionalities (enprésenting, 
retaining and expectation), and their self-exposition (the three 
determinants:  now, at-the-time and  then,  and their 
modulations). He discusses their origin in the unity of the three 
intentionalities and the horizons specific to each of them (to the 
present, the prior and the posterior). He also qualifies the 
structural moments of time: significance, datability, 
spannedness and publicness (Heidegger 1997, 369 sq.; 
Heidegger 1982, 268 sq.). He argues that the vulgar 
comprehension of time derives from its original understanding, 
which is possible due to one of its intrinsic modifications, 
namely “levelling”. 
Heidegger assimilates, up to a certain point, “the 
traditional understanding of time”, inspired by Aristotle, with 
the vulgar understanding of time. His objections refer to both 
conceptions. For example, in both cases, the distance between 
concept and something understood is considerable. However, Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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this is debatable. Furthermore, I do not know whether for 
common consciousness the nows are “free-floating, relationless”. 
Why would they be seen as floating freely and without relation 
to each other? In this case, how could one account for the idea – 
typical of the common consciousness – that there is an 
ineluctable order of time? How could we refer to dramatic 
situations, such as the “burden of time” or the “terror of 
history”? We do know that in each cultural or ethnographic 
space there have been many explorations on the “popular 
representations of time”. Should we then distinguish clearly 
between the popular understanding of time and the common 
one? Or does the common understanding involve several levels, 
ranging from the one described by ethnography to the one 
specific to a scientist or indeed to a philosopher, provided that 
the latter do not question certain concepts or representations? 
It is possible that Heidegger, like Husserl before him, focuses 
on the latter variant of common understanding9. 
 
2. Common representations and beliefs (Collingwood) 
 
Robin G. Collingwood examined at length the topic of common 
thought and understanding. He argued that the thinking 
operations  always occur against the background of common 
beliefs and representations, which he termed presuppositions. 
The act of thought does not involve mere statement, however 
subtle it may appear at a given point. In addition to the specific 
statement, the act of thought presupposes a question that it may 
provide an answer, and the common belief by reference to which 
a question is usually formulated. Thus, three elements converge 
to describe the act of thought: the statement itself, the question 
that may correspond to the statement and the presuppositions of 
a mental space. 
Examples of such presuppositions are well-known, 
especially as many are particularly resilient, such as those 
relating to existence, the self, time and space, reality and 
appearance. To a certain extent, they engage our deepest 
convictions, although they vary from one era to another and from 
one mental space to another. Such is the instance of the 
representation of time as circular, which was the foundation for META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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the development of natural sciences in ancient Greece. One is 
only rarely aware of their presence and significance. They 
underlie the questions of an era and how people ask those 
questions and what questions they are ready to answer. They 
include the belief in a natural order of the world or in the causal 
relation, interpreted differently from one era to another 
(Collingwood 1998, 49-55). One cannot argue that such beliefs 
are true or false, but rather active or inactive. 
Some of them can be considered truly metaphysical, for at 
least two reasons: firstly, because they refer to the nature and 
being of extant things; secondly, because they do not derive 
from other beliefs and consequently appear as “absolute” to us 
(Collingwood 1998, chap. VII). For example, the belief in a 
natural order of the world can be viewed as metaphysical only 
when it does not derive from another belief. 
I would like to focus on a rather peculiar aspect of 
presuppositions of a metaphysical kind. We are only rarely 
aware of their presence or significance. We rarely acknowledge 
them as ‘final instance’ data. Considering their condition, they 
cannot appear to us as true or false. They are never mere 
propositions, because they do not constitute answers to definite 
questions. They often emerge as a priori data, in which case 
they may be considered as “absolute presuppositions”, as 
designated by Collingwood. They are not the same with our 
presuppositions or subjective, reflecting what one might 
believe. They are not derived experience; on the contrary, they 
guide human experience10. They are accepted in advance and 
implicitly, sometimes for an entire era. 
Let us dwell for a while on this latter aspect. The 
presuppositions that we may call metaphysical have their own 
distinct history. They will emerge vigorously at a given moment 
and dominate an entire era in the life of humanity. Over time, 
they fade away, are eclipsed or less active. They are then 
substituted by others, without disappearing however. Their 
history seems to trace certain boundaries for the unfolding of 
real history. Over time they are subject to the effects of the 
passing of time, and their erosion means that one historical era 
must make way for a new one. This happened when the Greek-
Roman tradition encountered the New-Testament tradition. As Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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Collingwood states, “the pagan world died because of its own 
failure to keep alive its own fundamental convictions” 
(Collingwood 1998, 225). Therefore, when metaphysical 
convictions fade away, a form of civilisation becomes extinct. 
This happens in the first instance, in the everyday life of people. 
Metaphysics is therefore viewed in its two meanings, first 
of which as an implicit mode of comprehension, specific to an 
entire community. This refers above all to those “absolute 
presuppositions” active in people’s minds. Yet metaphysics also 
means the profound reflection on these presuppositions of the 
mind. Collingwood terms it simply “metaphysical analysis”. He is 
actually aware of his personal affiliation with both forms of 
metaphysics. As a regular person, living in a particular 
community in Western Europe, he shares many beliefs and 
images specific to his community variously related to history, the 
world, time or the everyday relation with the other. As a 
philosopher, he is driven to an analytical examination of these 
presuppositions, especially those which pertain to the nature of 
extant things, their being and the boundaries of their existence. 
As for the exploration of presuppositions, it has taken 
various forms, thanks in particular to epistemologists or 
historians of ideas (Holton 1978). Their own metaphysical 
analysis, as conducted by Collingwood and later by Strawson, 
Suppes, Searle and others, differs in numerous ways, as we will 
show below. 
 
3. An implicit and symbolical metaphysics (Eliade)  
 
Let us recall what Mircea Eliade states in the last pages of 
Images and Symbols (especially in the section Remarks upon 
Method). He focuses on a condition in which one may recognise 
the “metaphysical attitude” of people in traditional societies. He 
remarks, firstly, that certain modern scholars such as Edward 
Burnett Tylor or James George Frazer considered that the 
spiritual life in exotic lands was dominated by superstitions 
(“the product of ancestral fears or of ‘primitive’ stupidity”, as he 
concludes). They referred in particular to their religious life, 
difficult to separate from their aesthetic or technological 
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scholars were educated in an era that imposes a positivist 
perspective of human acts. Their statements about certain 
ancient beliefs ignore both the practical meaning of such beliefs 
and their elevated, symbolic character. 
In light of these perspectives, Eliade observes that 
archaic humanity reveals an “existential consciousness” 
concerning the Cosmos and himself. Moreover, it sheds light on 
a distinct metaphysical attitude. “Where a Frazer could see 
nothing but ‘superstition’, a metaphysic was already implicit, 
though it was expressed by a pattern of symbols rather than by 
the interplay of concepts: a metaphysic – that is, a whole and 
coherent conception of Reality, not a series of instinctive 
gestures ruled by the same fundamental ‘reaction of the human 
animal in the confrontation with Nature’” (Eliade 1952, 187 
sq.). Such metaphysics deals with the elementary distinction 
between appearance and reality (in fact between what “appears 
to be real” and the “true reality”). Such a distinction relies on 
the belief that “true reality” of the world does not emerge in the 
first stage of experience. It is not linked to the immediate state 
of things, rather it is archetypal in relation with them. Such 
consciousness seems to indicate, according to Eliade, a certain 
metaphysics, that is a vision of what may be considered real in 
the life-world. However, this vision is implicit, not explicit. It is 
expressed mainly by symbolic images and representations, not 
by highly elaborate concepts. The world it describes appears as 
an open and interconnected world (“everything is held together 
by a compact system of correspondences and likenesses). The 
symbolic images at play are proof of the awareness of “limit-
situations” and the situation of man in an open world. Similar 
ideas were developed by Carl-Gustav Jung, Ernst Cassirer, and 
later on by Gilbert Durand, Jean-Jacques Wunenburger and 
others. 
Eliade’s idea is important, as it highlights that there is 
always a metaphysics at play, even in the quoted case of an 
implicit metaphysics, expressed mainly by symbolic images or 
representations. Eliade’s claim does not refer directly to the 
common behaviour of man. More precisely, it does not refer to 
everyday behaviour as being merely ordinary, without 
discontinuities and singular moments. As we know, it concerns Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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a series of symbolic representations related to the mythical and 
religious behaviour or to the practice of magic. Such behaviours 
dislocate and – eventually – suspend the ordinary sequence of 
time and open up paths to other possible interpretations. Yet 
these behaviours are too a part of everyday life, making up its 
uncommon or out of the ordinary side. 
 
4. Shared conceptual schemes (Strawson) 
 
Similar to other 20th-century philosophers, Peter Strawson 
argues that the object of metaphysics is not nature as such (the 
nature of real things, possible principles, kinds of objects, etc.). 
Rather, it describes the actual structure of our thought about the 
world, meaning those concepts and categories which we use in 
order to think and to represent our world (Strawson 1959). Are 
they the same for all people, every time and everywhere? Do they 
explain the nature of man – his rationality, for instance – in 
terms of its characterizing universals? Or, on the contrary, does 
it entail considerable distinctions from one era to another and 
among different communities? 
Strawson’s notion of shared conceptual schemes is 
particularly important. The shared conceptual scheme is 
composed of concepts operated in everyday life. They 
interconnect to create a sort of tissue or web, which describes 
shared thought, and provide the basic elements for a mode of 
understanding the world, under variable temporal and spatial 
conditions. They represent the forms we use to demarcate and 
imagine the reality itself and our own situation within it. 
Yet never is a single conceptual structure active on its 
own. Consequently, such structures are bound to be competitive 
or, in certain situations, operate in alternation. Strawson focuses 
in particular on the conceptual scheme active at a given moment. 
He argues that this is the object of metaphysical reflection, more 
precisely of descriptive metaphysics. He interprets the 
presuppositions of knowledge as conceptual schemes, considering 
both common or everyday knowledge, and elaborate knowledge. 
The concepts in use are revealed as we utter them. In fact, the 
language we use predisposes to a distinct metaphysics (as we 
exhibit category-preference, favouring for instance the category META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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of relation or of process). The privilege claimed by a category 
modifies the meaning of a whole range of other categories. 
We may retain at least two aspects for the purposes of our 
discussion of everyday life. First, we can mention the fact that 
the metaphysician has turned his attention even more directly to 
the shared mode of thought. In this respect, what matters is not 
only the theoretical mode of thought but indeed the everyday or 
ordinary one. Second, each way of speaking – including the 
everyday one – activates a certain metaphysical inclination. 
Language – including everyday language – directs us to certain 
images of a metaphysical nature. It enables a vivid configuration 
of presupposition and thereby a metaphysics that we may call of 
common use. It is commonly and tacitly used. Commonly used, 
as the beliefs and concepts which express it sustain the concerns 
or expectations of an entire community. Tacitly used, because it 
is not articulated as such logically or formally. In their daily life, 
people do not necessarily seek to explain conceptually such 
beliefs or images. On the contrary, people effortlessly use them 
as references, rely on them for their statements or activities, 
because they take them for granted. 
 
5. “The metaphysical burden of social reality” (Searle) 
 
John R. Searle opened one of his later works, The Construction 
of Social Reality, with the rather startling subtitle 
“Metaphysical Burden of Social Reality”. He explained it in the 
opening lines of the book, by describing a problem that had 
puzzled him for a long time: “there are portions of the real 
world; objective facts in the world that are only facts by human 
agreement. In a sense there are things that exist only because 
we believe them to exist. I am thinking of things like money, 
property, governments, and marriages” (Searle 1995, 1). 
Therefore, certain things, though they “exist only because we 
believe them to exist”, are nevertheless real. Although they are 
dependent on our mental or subjective life, they do possess a 
dense, resilient objectivity.  
To use the author’s example, this happens when you go 
to a café, sit in a chair at a table, call the waiter and order a 
coffee. The waiter brings what you ordered, you drink it, leave Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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some money on the table and leave. “An innocent scene, but its 
metaphysical complexity is truly staggering, and its complexity 
would have taken Kant's breath away if he had ever bothered to 
think about such things.” (Searle 1995, 3) Why would such a 
scene leave Kant flabbergasted? Not necessarily because the 
German philosopher would have avoided entering a café, 
having a beer or a coffee and gazing outside the café window. 
But for another reason: if one attempted to describe what 
happens in this scene, one would not be able to capture the 
features of the description in the language of physics or 
mathematics. That is because the facts presented above become 
real on account of human beliefs and our language. Considering 
the case of the person who goes to the café, he is served exactly 
what he ordered, finds that the price is exactly the price quoted 
on the menu and notices that he is left alone for some time. 
There is here, as Searle notes, “a huge, invisible ontology” 
(Searle 1995, 3), which underlies everything that may happen 
to all of us, on an absolutely ordinary day.  
Appropriately, Searle invites the reader to embark on a 
metaphysical analysis of these ordinary events, which originate 
in the conventions we observe and our manner of speaking. 
He brings into play the notion of Background, as “a set 
of Background abilities, dispositions, and capacities that are 
not part of the intentional content and could not be included as 
part of the content” (Searle 1995, 132). He describes in great 
detail the functioning of the background, which enables 
linguistic and perceptive interpretations, gives an air of 
familiarity to conscious experiences and even a narrative or 
dramatic form. He also discusses the notion of Background 
presupposition, arguing that there exists a realism external to 
the subjective life (Searle 1995, chap. 6-8; Loux 2002, chap. 9). 
It becomes particularly important in everyday life, because it is 
a condition for the intelligibility of any discourse. Absent such 
presuppositions, many statements would be unintelligible and 
we would fail to follow a particular line of thought. It is, as 
Searle argues, a necessary presupposition for a large chunk of 
thought and language. It is not an empirical thesis, but rather 
it is construed as a necessary condition of intelligibility for 
certain types of theories. We can develop many theories on the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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existence of objects in space or on space itself, yet none of them 
will eliminate this condition of intelligibility: “our notions of 
‘objects’ and ‘space’ have to be radically revised, as in fact they 
have been revised by atomic theory and relativity theory, all the 
same, ER [external realism] remains untouched” (Searle 1995, 
182). This condition presupposed that there “is a way that 
things are that is independent of all representations of how 
things are” (Searle 1995, 182). The idea does not “identifies not 
how things are in fact” or determine their existence one way or 
another. In other words, it does not concern such issues whose 
solution is unfathomable or infinitely variable. Yet it achieves 
something of great importance, “it identifies a space of 
possibilities” (Searle 1995, 182). The meaning of any statement 
(for instance, “I have no money at all in my wallet”) becomes 
possible only on account of “the presupposition of the existence 
of money” (Searle 1995, 183). In other words, the meaning of 
the statement is articulated “against a space of possibilities of 
having money” (Searle 1995, 183). The idea of the reality of 
external things articulates “a space of possibilities for a very 
large number of statements” (Searle 1995, 183). It is connected 
with a background of presuppositions, each with a rather 
formal character, as horizons of possibilities. 
I would like to recall that Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. 
Austin, Patrick Strawson, Nelson Goodman and others are 
often quoted for their research on everyday language.  
As in the case of Collingwood’s thesis, metaphysics, in 
this case, engages two levels in our lives. On the one hand, it 
refers to certain human conventions and some capacities which 
are manifest in such experiences that constitute social acts. In 
other words, they are indicative of the invisible web of social 
reality – the “huge invisible ontology”, as Searle terms it 
(Searle 1995, 3). On the other hand, it denotes the conceptual 
analysis one conducts with reference to the construction of 
social reality. The whole debate about non-intentional 
capacities, for instance, or the background of presuppositions 
and its functioning revolves around the metaphysical analysis 
of social reality. 
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IV. The idea under consideration and several 
conclusions 
 
1. I believe that the situations described above indicate that 
there is, indeed, a metaphysics specific to everyday life. It 
appears as present constantly and before everything else 
(zunächst und zumeist, as Martin Heidegger says). Ultimately, 
every human experience – in the relationship with the others, 
the effort to acquire knowledge or things, in private life, in 
creative work and in religious life – underlies such 
metaphysics. Regardless of one’s pursuits or level of education 
of the mind, it is present at least in an implicit manner. 
Such metaphysics is not one and the same for all of us 
and at the same time. In the discussion so far I have 
recurrently used the singular form of a phrase, i.e. ‘an everyday 
metaphysics’. Yet this is due to the need for simplicity in 
expression. Because such metaphysics is related to the mental 
life of people or communities (Robin G. Collingwood), it is 
always plural. We might say, therefore, that there are as many 
everyday metaphysics at work as the distinct mental spaces we 
can recognise. They may coexist in a single mental space or can 
be in competition, sometimes clashing openly. This should not 
come as a surprise. On the contrary, their vibrant co-presence 
helps to explain certain typical phenomena in everyday life: 
fragmented forms of consciousness, deeply equivocal 
behaviours, duplications or hypocrisies in relations with the 
others, impersonal modes of life, and attitudes of total 
indecision or indifference.  
We might call it, in certain cases, usual metaphysics, for 
at least two reasons: 1) it is a set of representations and 
meanings already active, that is, in use; 2) such representations 
or images become familiar and spent semantically, at least in 
certain situations. 
As far as I can observe, the presence of this everyday 
metaphysics is acknowledged most often indirectly. There are 
references to implicit metaphysics, such as it is assumed on 
account of particular modes of thought (Robin G. Collingwood), 
or symbolic practices (Mircea Eliade). A latent or underlying 
metaphysics has also been invoked (Williard Van Orman META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Quine), especially with reference to statements of existence and 
modality (related to the possible, necessary or contingent 
character of certain relations). This is practically unavoidable 
in the case of de re formulations, especially descriptive ones, 
about the states of things or events. It also concerns the deontic 
or moral modalities, as they are matched by ontological 
assumptions. 
Taking into account the way of thinking of some of those 
who reflect on the issue of metaphysics, Jacques Derrida argues 
that in their case there is a concealed, camouflaged 
metaphysics, of which they are most often unaware; or even a 
residual metaphysics because, while they provide arguments 
against old ideas (“principle”, “reality taken for granted”, etc.), 
they allow unwittingly similar representations in their own 
discourse. Richard Rorty often makes reference to the presence 
of an underlying metaphysics, recognisable by in-depth 
language analysis. Beliefs commonly in use and the common 
way of speaking constantly actualise a common metaphysics 
(John R. Searle). Highly relevant in this respect are the shared 
beliefs against which the reality of everyday and social order is 
articulated. Moreover, such situations do not engage only the 
one who relies on common language, but also the speaker who 
may possess a certain theoretical training. 
Ultimately, this type of metaphysics can be viewed as 
trivial, as Vincent Descombes terms it, commenting on Quine 
(Descombes 2000, 13). This designation plays on the ancient 
meaning of the word (the Latin trivium used to define the place 
where three roads meet, an easily accessible crossroad, where a 
weekly fair would be held). In other words, such metaphysics is 
specific to the life of a fair or market – precisely why it applies 
to everyday life. It becomes clear now that it is articulated, to a 
certain extent, through the regular and negotiated use of 
certain images or ideas.  
 
2. As we can notice, ordinary or common metaphysics has been 
discussed frequently. It is viewed either as latent, or hidden, 
camouflaged. In certain respects, it involves residual elements. 
To the extent that it is common, it will sometimes be called 
vulgar or even trivial, as has been shown above. Through each Ştefan Afloroaei / The Everyday Condition of Metaphysics 
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of these terms will come to light its everyday character, the fact 
that it is active in people’s everyday lives. 
We know that in the past there were also discussions 
about metaphysica naturalis, considered to be real in that there 
is an inevitable inclination of the human mind to formulate 
certain ideas or questions which go beyond any sensitive 
experience (for example, ideas of the possibility of free action, of 
the nature of the human soul or of the existence of God). Such 
metaphysics must be re-assessed in critical terms, as Kant 
argued, for instance (Afloroaei 2008, 9-12). We could accept, in 
the case of everyday life, the prevalence of “natural attitude”, 
yet what the phrase expresses should not be viewed as 
something deficient. Its “natural” condition does not exclude it 
from the scope of reflection proper, however simple it may 
appear to us at a given moment. However, it should not be 
confused with “popular metaphysics”, unsystematic, which 
modern authors often quote, for instance Hegel, in his lectures 
on the history of philosophy, or Schopenhauer, in The World as 
Will and Representation (Schopenhauer 1958, vol. II, chap. 
XVII). 
Metaphysics, therefore, may be encountered in an 
everyday form, as a tacit or underlying metaphysics of our 
understanding in our day-to-day life. I would note that precisely 
this usual or everyday hypostasis of metaphysics has been 
increasingly under scrutiny, especially since Nietzsche. 
Consequently, like our everyday life or, considering its sources, 
the life of our collective unconscious, it calls for ever more 
extensive and varied interpretations. I would place the interest 
in such metaphysics in an analogous situation with the focus on 
common, natural language or with the research on the mental 
life of communities. We know that this interest has grown 
enormously over the past century, especially after the Second 
World War, which profoundly changed our everyday and 
cultural history.   
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 This is a possible interpretation of Charles Péguy’s statement, in Notre jeunesse 
(1910), that every person has his own metaphysics, manifest or latent, otherwise 
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they would not exist as man. This proposition was borrowed from – and, to an 
extent, assumed by – Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1948, 53; 1964, 138). 
2 Highly illustrative in this respect is Emil Cioran’s attitude towards metaphysics, 
knowing that he did not accept himself as philosopher, less so as metaphysician 
(Cioran and Jaudeau 1990). 
3 Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann (1966, II, 1 b-d) describe the constitution 
of everyday reality in relation to the data of common sense and ordinary 
knowledge, founded on common sense. The meaning of ordinary life can be 
delimited in a more general manner, as Charles Taylor (1989, III, 13. 1) did, 
when referring to aspects of human life related to work, producing the necessities 
of life, and life as sexual beings, including here marriage and family. This is 
what Aristotle considered when he stated that the purposes of political 
association are “life itself and the good life” (zên kai euzên). In other words, 
ordinary life spans everything necessary to achieve in order to sustain and restore 
our life. 
4 It would be useful here, I believe, to recall Sigmund Freud’s assertion in the 
essay  Das Unheimliche (1920), precisely on the actualisation of the dual 
meaning of the term uncanny, unheimlich. He observes in advance that the sense 
of uncanniness is generated either by “outdated” beliefs, or by suppressing 
certain complexes. 
5 Cf. Sloterdijk (1983, I), especially the section “Anyone, or: The Most Real 
Subject of Modern Diffuse Cynicism”. The issue has long been in focus, if we 
consider, for instance, Erving Goffman (1959). 
6 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, I, 1) insist on the ordinary or 
routine side of everyday reality. Many of their claims are highly debatable. Thus, 
the authors state that everyday reality does not appear as problematic and as a 
result people suppress immediately certain possible doubts. Reality, they argue, 
does not make room for dreams or to personal activities related to one’s free 
time, less so to play, aesthetic or religious experience. The temporality of 
everyday life would appear, in such a case, to be levelled and finite, coercive, 
and linked only to certain strictly pragmatic preoccupations. 
7 However, banality may also require a different approach. This is called for not 
only in an excellent title: Alexandru Dragomir, Utter Metaphysical Banalities 
(Dragomir 2004), but also researchers such as Jacques Le Goff. Specifically, in 
mediaeval France, the term banalités, in the plural form, indicated a range of 
items (mill, wine press, oven, breeding animals, etc.) considered to be common 
and ordinary. More precisely, they served all the people on a seigniorial estate, 
provided they paid certain taxes in exchange. The seignior was the only one who 
had the legal right to own them and grant use, being therefore the true master of 
banal things. 
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8 Especially after Hans Vaihinger (1965), we have been well aware that 
theoretical attitude itself is not detached from the as-if consciousness. This 
means that, separate from the as-if mode specific to technical or conceptual 
attitude, one must carefully delimit the mode typical of everyday life. As regards 
the ontology of everyday life, cf. Jean Baudrillard (1968, chap. I); Alfred Schutz 
and Thomas Luckmann (1973); Claude Romano (1998). I refer to them 
especially because of their reflections on everyday life and on communication – 
or understanding in the space of this life, although their thematisations are vastly 
different from each other. A noteworthy study on these writings and the issues 
related to everyday life has been published by Ciprian Mihali (2001). 
9 From a phenomenological perspective, such analyses would later be continued 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer (centred, for example, on the speculative structure of 
language), Jan Patočka (1988), Paul Ricoeur, in essays concerning 
psychoanalysis, such as the “Reflection: An Archaeology of the Subject (Ricoeur 
1970, 419-459), Bernhard Waldenfels (exploring the question of the other, 
Fremdheit (Waldenfels 2006) and others. 
10 Commenting on Collingwood’s idea, Stephen Toulmin (1988, 8 sq.) does not 
overlook what Thomas Kuhn would later claim, namely the presence of paradigms 
of the cognitive and research practice. He also quotes Alasdair MacIntyre, who 
would describe, in Short History of Ethics, those conceptual configurations whose 
changes profoundly shaped Western moral thought. Important books on this topic 
have been written by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, part II, § 3), directly 
referencing Collingwood (concerning “the logic of question and answer”), or 
Patrick Suppes (1985), who placed metaphysical presuppositions in relation with 
the language we speak and whose grammar code we take for granted. 
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